Diaries of Anne Lister (1988)

A plea for the individual
Academic accounting research on financial reporting and accountability tends to be concerned with either the private corporate or, more recently, the public and voluntary sectors. In this context financial reporting is seen as a mode of accountability for, or representation of, public or private organisations and institutions, as distinct from individuals. Individuals are of course present as actors in both the corporate and public sector, and in the academic study of them.
For instance, institutions may have to report to individuals, political power can be seen as being vested in democratic governments by individuals, and of course individuals act both within the organisations and institutions subject to accounting and as professional accountants. But in such studies the primary focus remains at the organisational level.
A dimension which therefore appears to be largely absent from contemporary studies of financial reporting and accountability in the UK is the instances and manner in which individuals have to account for themselves financially. This is despite the fact that accounting has never operated exclusively in an organisational context. At a purely personal level the historical record provides potentially rich pickings here: for instance, the seventeenth century diaries of Pepys (1970) , those of Boswell (1985) in the eighteenth and of Lister (1988) in the early nineteenth centuries provide a wealth of detail on household accounting and personal financial accountability. Diarists and other auto/biographers often take great care to give an account of personal finances along with the other details of everyday life. Indeed, personal financial reporting and accountability embody all the familiar elements of auto/biography: the story told is from a personal standpoint and has a potentially problematic role to play vis-a-vis the reader or "user".
Contemporary research on social policy has tackled issues such as cash flows and accountability within households (see for instance: Vogler and Pahl, 1994) . Those people who work for themselves in unincorporated and usually small businesses, who I shall loosely and collectively refer to as the self-employed, represent a further area of contemporary interest, and are the focus of this paper 1 . In the UK they represent a growing proportion of the workforce, yet have a low visibility in accounting and other academic research. Successive UK Conservative
Governments have, since 1979, sought to widen of the definition of selfemployment and encouraged a growth in qualifying activities. The policy motivations here are multifold and include a desire to encourage entrepreneurial 1 This paper draws extensively on work which I have done in collaboration with Anne Corden of the Social Policy Research Unit at the University of York on self-employed applicants for means tested social security benefits (Corden et al, 1993; Boden and Corden, 1994; Boden and Corden, 1996) and our ongoing work on absent self-employed parents and the UK Child Support Agency.
activity, to reduce the numbers of people recorded as unemployed and to lighten employment costs by redefining workers as self-employed and thereby entitled to lesser employment protection rights and attracting lower employment overheads.
Whatever the policy motivations, the consequence has been a growth in people defined as self-employed. One of the major implications for the affected individuals has been the manner in which they have to account for themselves financially, particularly with regard to state authorities. The purpose of this paper is to problematise financial reporting by the self-employed, illustrating and explicating the issues in order to place them firmly on the accounting research agenda.
Viewing such individuals as accountable financial subjects brings fresh consideration to themes familiar in critical accounting. Thus issues of the power to construct technical rules and to shape the reporting environment, the balance of power between reporters and users, the use to which information is put, skills, resources and costs are all pertinent here.
Why do we need the "self-employed"?
A theme central to this paper is that the labelling of certain individuals as selfemployed is the product of regulatory and administrative imperatives: that is, a need on the part of state authorities to define certain types of economically active individuals as a discrete group in order that they can be treated distinctly. One aspect of this is the need to measure self-employed income in a different way to that from employment. An individual who is an employee is subject to financial regulatory control by virtue of their employer's relationship with the state. Thus UK employers must provide details of employee's earnings (defined as that which the employee receives by virtue of their post) to the Government and are also responsible, for instance, for making deductions with regard to taxation and contributory national insurance benefits. Employers may become increasingly involved in other aspects of the financial regulation of individuals if there is an increasing use of devices such as attachment of earnings orders for payments (eg child maintenance) where there is a large degree of individual non-compliance. A self-employed individual, who by definition has no employer, cannot be similarly regulated, necessitating the development of a new mechanisms of surveillance and control. The need for new and more efficient forms of control has become particularly marked as self-employment has continued to rise at spectacular rates, bringing more people (and often with much lower incomes) within its net.
This growth and increasing importance of regulatory control of the self-employed, particularly with regard to the measurement of their income, can be seen as a juridifying tendency, with individuals becoming juridical subjects in their own right and subject to an extension of state rules, laws and powers. It has been argued that as such regulatory law expands it draws in and upon other disciplines as law itself reaches its own boundaries of competence and capacity (Teubner, 1987) . Thus state control over large numbers of people who it defines as selfemployed requires their income to be measured, and this can only be done by the adoption of some accounting technology. Miller and Power (1992) argue that rather than the co-option of accounting into a juridical process, what may be in evidence is competition between law and inter alia accounting for regulatory space.
This process may be particularly evident in the area of child support, where court based juridical systems employing traditional discretion are being replaced with bureaucratic systems employing a rigid formula grounded in quantitative measures.
This growth in administrative, and fundamentally regulatory, control over individuals has gone largely unheeded and unnoticed. It stands in contrast to the large measure of self-regulation deemed appropriate in financial accountability for corporate organisations. And even though the marketisation of the public sector has resulted in the more overt application of new accounting technologies for financial accountability (Hopwood, 1994; Pendlebury et al, 1992) , these technologies are modelled upon those of the private corporate sector and are at least therefore reasonably transparent. This is not the case for the self-employed, where distinct and diverse financial reporting regimes have been developed with little apparent regard for existing best commercial practice, harmonisation, involvement of the self-employed or transparency and openness. The implicit paradox here is that whilst the self-employed supposedly enjoy a greater degree of freedom and independence of action by virtue of their status, they are also subject to an increasing array of regulatory and other administrative controls. These controls are often presented as being objective and imbued with an authority derived from their rules-based nature.
An analysis of these issues necessitates a discussion of who the "self-employed" are and the mechanisms by which they are thus defined: this follows in Section II of this paper. Section III describes the recent growth in self-employment in the UK and considers some of the financial accountability issues which that growth engenders. In Sections IV attention is turned to the nature and applicability of financial reporting requirements imposed on the self-employed, whilst in Section V the practicalities of eliciting financial information from such groups is discussed. This is then followed by some concluding remarks in which I probably raise more questions than I am currently able to answer.
II. Who are the self-employed?
"28 November, 1660 I find that Mr. Creed hath sent me the 11l 05s.00 that is due to me upon the remaynes of account for my sea business-which is also so much clear money to me; and my bill of impresse for 30l is also cleared. So that I am wholly cleared as to the Sea in all respects. To the office and was there till late at night-and among the officers do hear that we may have our Salaryes allowed by the Treasurer"
Diaries of Samuel Pepys (1970)
The self-employed individuals which form the focus of this paper have only one common characteristic: they are all categorised as self-employed by some external agency. Individuals may not agree with the categorisation applied to them, but the bureaucratic and rules-based nature of such agencies means there can be no scope for self-inclusion or exclusion. All manifestations of the legal or regulatory categorisation of self-employment cohere around the notion of earning one's living in a particular way, and in particular distinguish the self-employed individual from the employee.
"Self-employed adj.earnings one's living in one's own business or through freelance work, rather than as the employee of another".
(Collins English Dictionary, 1979) The self-employed are therefore a labelled group, and their definition by how income is earned prevails over the extensive non-homogeneity of those earning their living through business, binding together a very disparate group. An individual can of course be both self-employed and employed simultaneously if they have two or more sources of income.
The earliest example of this regulatory imperative to institute forms of regulation and control over, and special provision for, discrete groups on the grounds of the nature of their economic activity is in the taxation of income. Lord McNaughten may have blithely stated that "Income tax, if I may be pardoned for saying so, is a tax on income..." (London County Council v Attorney General, AC 26 at 35) but he failed to resolve the vexing question of what exactly income was, and what sorts of income were taxable incomes. Ultimately income can only be that which has the character of income, and that character is either socially, economically, politically or legally defined. In matters of taxation the UK Parliament and the courts have followed Adam Smith's (1776) logic that income has to be derived from some source in the same manner that fruit is derived from a tree, facilitating an important distinction between income and capital (John Smith & Son v. Moore).
But of course, it may not be deemed desirable to tax all ' fruits': a marriage may be a source of income for a non-working wife but it would be a radical step to suggest that such income should be taxed. The problem of defining income was therefore resolved to some extent in UK legislation by subjecting only the "fruits" (income) of specified "trees" (sources) to taxation. Hence the UK has a schedular system of taxation in which the sources were defined as, inter alia, income from employment (employees) and income from "trades, professions and vocations" (the self-employed). The schedular system permits incomes from selfemployment to be measured and assessed in an appropriate manner distinct from income from employment.
During this century in the UK a mixture of statute, case law and practice has resulted in the incremental refinement and clarification of the definitions of both "employment" and "trades, professions and vocations" -or self-employment.
Employees are now defined for taxation, and indeed for most other purposes, as The reliance on legal and administrative distinctions between employed and selfemployed income in the absence of any more essentialist criteria inevitably means that the categorisation of some people's incomes appears anomalous. For instance, owner/managers of very small incorporated businesses may have a level of control over the business, particularly with regard to access for resources for themselves, which renders their personal position more akin to that of a self-employed person than the employee status with which they are legally accorded (Boden and Corden, 1994; Eardley and Corden, 1994) . Difficulties are also encountered in areas where, in response to pressure from certain business sectors, as a result of historical tradition, or because of complex, diverse and generally "muddy" contractual employment arrangements, state agencies permit what can often appear to be aberrant classifications. For example, sub-contract building site workers are often categorised as self-employed for taxation, national insurance and social security purposes, yet many work fixed hours for a fixed wage reward, supplying no tools or materials and are therefore indistinguishable in their work practices from most employees (Boden and Corden, 1994) . It is also not uncommon for those working in financial sectors such as insurance or pensions sales to be "self-employed" whilst working with only one company and even being provided with office space, materials and so on. The pressures to permit the ' employer' to classify those undertaking work for the organisation to be known as self-employed is understandable: self-employment may give greater freedom for the individual in certain respects, but also denies them access to employment protection legislation, pensions and other employee benefits. It might therefore be expected that there will be continuing pressure towards a loose interpretation of self-employment, particularly if the UK ever adopts minimum wage legislation.
In these circumstances some people have difficulty in determining what the status of their income is, and, consequently, the rules and procedures to which they are subject. For example, research on family credit (Boden and Corden, 1994) found one applicant, a childminder, who maintained that the research project was not pertinent to her as she was not 'in business'-she simply looked after peoples' children at home in return for payment. In fact she was defined as self-employed under the family credit rules.
There can be very real consequences of such confusion: incorrect categorisation (by either the organisation or the individual) may result in delay or even financial loss for either the individual or the organisation. For instance, an outworker applying for family credit (Boden and Corden, 1994) defined herself as an employee despite the fact that she was self-employed under the regulations. When asked for income information as a self-employed person she disclosed only her gross turnover, not realising that as someone who was self-employed she could also claim her business expenses. This applicant probably lost benefit as a result. Conversely, the rules based nature of the definitions may also mean that some people are able to manipulate the system to their advantage. The same study (Boden and Corden, 1994) found a company director/principal shareholder who was very aware that by retaining income within the company rather than paying it to herself as salary or dividend she could depress her assessed personal income thereby maximising her family credit award whilst accumulating wealth within her company. Similarly the tax system abounds with cases where individuals have realised that by shifting their status between employment and self-employment they can gain a represents an attempt to escape unemployment, or to facilitate workforce restructuring by employers anxious to reduce labour costs. The result is that many of those involved can be characterised as 'quasi self-employed': lacking both the autonomy of real entrepreneurs and the security afforded to employees by the legal system (Eardley and Corden, 1994) . Much of this new self-employment generates income only in the lower deciles (Meager et al, 1994) and has been described by Wheelock and Baines (1994) as 'self-exploitation'.
III. The self-employed in the UK
There are four principal reasons why the range and nature of financial reporting by the self-employed might have expanded considerably in recent years. First, the greater numbers of people with income from self-employment has, in itself, led to an increase in the numbers of people reporting income to ubiquitous regulatory bodies such as taxation authorities. Second, given the predominance of the new self-employed at the lower end of the income scale, greater interaction with public and private organisations which provide means-tested benefits and other assistance to those on low incomes might be anticipated. The Benefits Agency has noted that the scale of it's self-employed workload has increased significantly, causing it to give serious renewed consideration to the rules and procedures operated for this group (Boden and Corden, 1994) . Third, the stimulation of an "enterprise culture" has taken place within the context of various forms of state and private/voluntary sector assistance with business start-up and development.
These schemes all require some sort of financial reporting from the self-employed.
And finally, there is also the growth in the number of benefits, reliefs and agencies, such as the Child Support Agency, which necessitate income reporting from all of those within their remit, including the self-employed 2 .
Accounting and the individual
The self-employed person may therefore be exposed to requests and demands from a wide variety of state, voluntary or private sector quarters for information of a financial nature. Some of these interactions may be mandatory, such as taxation or assessments for child support payments, whilst others will be elective, such as applications for means-tested social security benefits or business development loans and grants. Table One gives an indication of some of the instances in which an individual in the UK may elect or be required to provide financial information.
Even though some interactions are de jure elective, the de facto situation may be that failure to comply with requests may result in financial loss or disadvantage, leaving the individual with little effective choice.
APPROX POSITION OF TABLE ONE
The information supplied by individuals, either compulsorily or through some elective process, is much more likely to form the basis of a specific calculative interaction with an authority rather than enhancing some less specific "accountability" by contributing to information flows. Financial reporting for individuals is essentially for administrative or other regulatory purposes and will almost invariably have a direct, specific and traceable impact on their personal financial position.
In the interests of accuracy and consistency in calculation, and of equity of treatment, the dominant mode is for individual official bodies to make regulations regarding the reporting of self-employed income. The influential role of governmental organisations in determining the nature and processes of reporting and assessment of self-employed income has important implications for the balance of power vis-a-vis reporters and users. Interaction between individuals and private sector organisations, such as banks, may not be statutorily controlled, but the individual may also be at a relative disadvantage when, for instance, seeking funds. Above all, an important distinction must be made between the demands placed upon individuals and those placed on corporations. The latter tend to be dominated by more general and less specific requirements to enhance information flows, and to do so in a way largely determined through selfregulation or the intervention of a self-regulated accounting profession. What is evident for the self-employed is that they are much more likely to be subject to highly specific regulatory control and that the information which they provide will be used in highly calculative interactions which will have a direct and obvious impact on their personal financial position.
Self-employed people work in a huge variety of businesses, with extremely varied circumstances and skill levels in dealing with financial matters. This nonhomogeneity presents something of a financial reporting challenge: to find efficient, efficacious and fair ways for such people to report their income to a wide variety of users with very different needs. Not only must the technical rules associated with income measurement be fair and meet the policy needs of the organisation to which they are reporting, but the system itself must be workable.
To this general challenge the UK situation adds a further difficulty: there exists no central, harmonised approach towards the definition, measurement or operational systems for assessing self-employed income. Individuals are therefore presented with a whole panoply of sometimes markedly different rules and procedures operated by the different organisations to which they may be financially accountable. In particular, whilst accountants may be involved with the preparation of accounts, or in negotiating with agencies on their clients' behalf, the 
A role for accounting and accountants?
A major point of distinction between financial accountability of individuals and of public/private sector organisations relates to the role of professional accountants and traditional commercial accounting. Whilst generally agreed commercial accounting practices, and their practitioners, obviously dominate the construction of accountability rules and environments in the private sector, and have had a significant impact in the public sector (Hopwood, 1994; Pendlebury et al, 1992) , their influence is much less marked on matters involving reporting by individuals.
Because the reporting requirements on the self-employed arise in the main from regulatory or administrative need, and because the self-employed are a disparate group with little individual or collective power, they tend to be imposed by the authorities. This can be contrasted with the large degree of self-regulation evident in the corporate sector. Whilst consultation may take place with trade associations and other similar groups, in the final analysis the detailed rule making powers which create reporting and accountability systems for the self-employed lie exclusively within the realm of regulatory law. In such circumstances it can be of little surprise that the systems created are designed to meet the policy aims and objectives of regulators and administrators. Moreover, because the accountability demands are disparate and differently motivated, the range of reporting requirements comes to mirror this diversity, increasing the costs and reducing the transparency of the system for the self-employed.
Traditional commercial accounting and its practitioners have had an influence on accountability for individuals, but most noticeably where the regulatory regime also applies to corporate entities 3 . Thus, when the courts were left with the task earlier this century of elaborating on the term "profits" used, but not defined, in the income tax legislation, they adopted a robust and commonsensical approach grounded in commercial accounting principles: "...we think it can now be taken as settled that the profits or losses of a business for tax purposes are to be computed in accordance with established commercial accountancy principles as they apply to the particular business in question, subject nevertheless to a number of qualifications." (Cmd 8189, para 133) In the face of corporate pressure, and perhaps a naive view from the courts, it is perhaps not surprising that commercial accounting became the basis for the calculation of profits for income tax purposes. Whilst accounting and taxation profits have never been synonymous, accounting profit remains the starting point for the calculation of taxable income and the symbiotic relationship between the two still is still a matter of active debate. The expertise of accountants in defining commercial accounting principles has also been acknowledged by the courts (Heather v PE Consulting).
This early (and arguably misplaced) faith in and reliance on the veracity, objectivity and suitability of commercial accounting measures has not been sustained across all regulatory or administrative organisations. Most notably, in those regulatory areas where individuals rather than corporations predominate, and where the accounting profession has only a low visibility, there has been a tendency for authorities to develop independent approaches. For instance, in 1988 family credit replaced family income supplement as the principle social security benefit for low-income working families. This development brought with it changes in the way in which self-employed income was to be measured. Previously a necessity, accruals based accounts were no longer admissible and information on cash income was to be provided via a questionnaire prepared by the applicant instead. None of the professional accountancy institutes appear on the circulation list for the consultative document mooting these changes, and they were therefore unable to comment on the proposals. The non-participation of accountants in the consultation process was to prove problematic: the resulting furore over the nonacceptability of traditional accounts led to a hurried revision of the regulations, making both cash-flow questionnaires and standard accounts admissible (Boden and Corden, 1994) . Despite this late change of heart, the policy shift presaged a major readjustments of the technical rules on which income was assessed. Chiefly, traditional accounting notions of trading income were abandoned for some time, to be supplanted by a more onerous rule that all flows into the business (cash or kind, loans and capital) were trading income. Although accruals accounts were accepted as a format, the information they contained was therefore subject to different interpretations not grounded in commercial accounting practice: the mould had been broken.
The influence of conventional commercial accounting has been varied and patchy. In general, examination of the technical rules and standards of public sector bodies eliciting self-employed income information suggests that commercial accounting principles and the accounting profession is far from dominant in the shaping of practice. It can be posited that the relatively small amount of influence enjoyed by commercial accountants and accounting in this area is due to two principal factors.
First, institutionally, this may be an area where accountants and their professional expertise have, for whatever reason, had little power and influence.
And second, it may be that user needs are, quite simply, best met by other means.
The large accounting institutions appear to have only limited involvement with self-employed issues, although there is a seed corn of genuine interest (Boden and Corden, 1994) . There may be a number of reasons for this: the growth in selfemployment and therefore of the importance of the issue is a relatively recent phenomena; the professional institutions may traditionally have been seen by themselves and by others as connected exclusively with either corporate or public sector accounting; and, perhaps somewhat naively, those outside the accounting profession may have had a feeling that if 'accounts' in the traditional sense are not part of the income measurement process then there is no role for 'the accountant' or indeed 'accounting'. In addition, the institutions may justifiably be more concerned with issues which directly affect the interests of their members: most of whom will be in practices which do not deal with very low-income self-employed people. The Institute of Chartered Accountants, Scotland does have an active involvement in this area, and this may be because ICAS is dominated to a greater extent by sole or very small practitioners who may have a significant selfemployed client base. For instance, a group of Scottish small practitioners from a remote rural community became extremely vocal and well organised within ICAS on the matter of the assessment of self-employed incomes for family credit purposes (Boden and Corden, 1994) . There is also evidence of change-research on the Child Support Agency indicates that when the self-employed constituency is no longer exclusively very low income (as it is with DSS benefits) then there is a greater level of accounting professional involvement and a higher degree of interest from the ICAEW.
A world without accountants?
Given that commercial accountings are produced with certain end-users in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that organisations eliciting information for their own specific purposes from the self-employed will, to the extent that they have the power to do so, prioritise their own primary policy objectives. Thus the Inland Revenue seeks to conduct an essentially historical exercise to establish the income earned during a past period in order to tax it. The measure used is the income enjoyed or enjoyable. For other organisations the policy objective is much more forward looking. For instance, family credit supplements a family's immediate cash income by means of an award which lasts for the ensuing six months and which is not re-examinable. Therefore some indication of likely future cash income is required and the historical income figure is used as an, albeit imperfect, predictor.
In terms of rule-making power there may be a happy medium to be struck here.
Completely autonomous actions by individual authorities in defining rules for financial accountability by the self-employed may offer the prospect of efficient and effective regulation, but there will inevitably be a cost in terms of reporter confusion which will also have repercussions for the regulators in terms of costs, 
i) Definition of income
Nearly all regulatory demands for financial accountability from the self-employed require some measure of revenue income or profit. The definition of income is as complex as it is diverse, but has traditionally rested upon notions of a distinction between income and capital (see for instance, Smith, 1776). In theory this distinction enables users of accounts to discern the value added to capital utilised by a business entity. Allied to this, the matching principle facilitates the measurement of profit in a specified period. As a business measure such approaches therefore have much to commend them. But they are constructed with specific objectives in mind. When looking at other regulatory purposes it is important to consider whether trading profit is a suitable approximation for income, and whether accruals accounting is an appropriate means of income recognition. Thus there are two central issues: what is to be defined as income, and the manner in which it should be recognised.
In the absence of any essentialist criteria, the definition of income is dependent upon the policy objectives of the regulatory system concerned. Two contrasting examples serve to illustrate how two different agencies have approached the problem of income definition. The tax system, with its schedular basis and concern with taxing the ' fruits' from ' trees' such as trades was obliged by the courts to accept a definition of income firmly rooted in commercial accounting. Whilst such an approach has a certain logical consistency, it has proved far from unproblematic. By the 1960s tax payers were beginning to appreciate that in a sophisticated financial world there was an uncertain boundary between income and capital, and that by representing some accretion of wealth as being of a capital one could escape not only income tax but tax altogether. This problem was overcome not by the state redefining income to include such sums, but by introducing capital gains tax.
The Department of Social Security's family credit rules adopted until very recently a wholly different definition of income. The family credit regulations state that self-employed earnings are the gross receipts of the business less allowable expenses. The Adjudication Officers' Guide (the definitive rulebook for putting social security systems into operation un the UK) defined receipts of the business literally as any item in cash or kind coming into the business. Thus not only was turnover included, but also any capital receipts, any loans taken out, any capital introduced by the self-employed person and so on. Indeed, any sum which was recorded as incoming into the business, whatever its nature, was included as income. This interpretation stands in stark contrast to rulings by the courts in tax matters (see for instance Higgs v. Olivier). The interpretation applied by the Department of Social Security did not extend to expenditure: capital expenditure is disallowed except in certain very specific circumstances and includes many items where the receipt of a similar sum would count as income. A subsequent ruling by the Social Security Commissioner has amended this interpretation to one where the gross receipts of the business are those earned by the business, but also include the proceeds of the sale of business assets.
The original interpretation of the definition of income by the Department of Social Security followed advice given by the Government's Chief Adjudication Service and was justified by the argument that it was no part of the remit of the social security system to subsidise the development of businesses, and that to treat any cash or kind coming into the business as not available for the applicant to live on would provide a subsidy.
On the issue of income recognition, again the same two agencies serve as interesting contrasting examples. Historically, the Inland Revenue has been concerned to tax the profits earned in the basis period of taxation. The definition of profit has been developed largely using commercial accounting principles and this included notions of matching and accruals. To the tax authorities the acceptance of accruals based accounts is therefore not problematic. The Inland
Revenue has the power to accept cash based accounts but are generally reluctant to do so because of the opportunities they provide for income deferral.
For the Department of Social Security the imperative is somewhat different. The notion of accounting profit has little relevance to an organisation attempting to assess how much cash an applicant for a benefit has to live on and therefore how much cash supplementation is appropriate to give them an acceptable cash income. Benefits are committed to provide immediate cash assistance to applicants and therefore the appropriate measure of income would appear to be available cash from the business. In fact under the family credit rules, following the brouhaha over the decision to no longer accept accounts in 1988, both the accruals basis and the cash basis are acceptable, and indeed applicants may switch between the systems in a way that could amount to benefits planning. This approach has also been adopted for Disability Working Allowance and indeed by the Child Support Agency in its regulations. Some Housing Benefit officers have a further measure: when accruals accounting or cash accounting income is lower than the proprietor's drawings from the business some take the latter as the measure of cash income (Corden et al, 1993) .
Regulatory agencies therefore need to pay careful attention to the definition of income and of the choice of measurement criteria (accruals accounting or cash).
The systems devised must be appropriate for the policy aims of the authority.
Openness as to policy aims, together with widespread consultation, should ensure that individuals do not suffer as a result of the selection of such criteria and that they are appropriate to what regulators are attempting to achieve. Part of the difficulty with, say, the original family credit interpretation of income was that the system was not the product of widespread consultation or even any significant degree of openness. Moreover, there were initially no significant lobby groups able to take up such matters.
ii) Basis periods
Because all accountings are periodic in nature organisations measuring selfemployed income need to select appropriate basis periods. The basis period adopted will be a compromise between the needs of the organisation (it may need an ex post measure or an indication of current/future earnings and administrative ease or practicality. Historical measures of income within defined time-frames are the most simple option, consisting as they do of past and largely verifiable events.
Historical measures are best suited to ex post regulatory regimes where the primary concern is what has passed, such as with income tax or value added tax.
But where the income measure is used as an indication of current or likely future income flows the use of historical measures is much more problematic because they may have very poor predictive value. A wide range of means-tested social security benefits aim to supplement claimants' cash income. They do this by awarding benefit for a fixed period (usually six months) in advance. This produces a requirement for accurate information on likely future earnings over the ensuing benefit period. Only in some housing benefit areas do officials do an ex post reassessment of benefit comparing actual historical earnings with the original benefit awarded and make any appropriate adjustment.
Most self-employed earnings, especially cash earnings (as distinct from accruals profit), will fluctuate, often quite widely, over time. Moreover, the pattern of earnings will vary from trade to trade. Thus a farmer will have quite specific and predictable variations in cash flows, whilst a taxi driver may suffer a wholly unexpected downturn of earnings due to, say, a vehicle failure. It is not unreasonable to expect the self-employed to budget over a longer period than, for instance, weekly or monthly salaried staff. But the question arises as to what is a reasonable period. Small farmers interviewed in the family credit work (Boden and Corden, 1994) experienced severe difficulties here. Their income cycle is annual, with marked fluctuations between summer and winter. But they could be assessed on their cash earnings during the six months when they are their highest. This will depress the level of family credit paid for the ensuing six, lean, winter months.
In some cases there will be no historical information at all-for instance when someone has newly started in self-employment. Because benefits such as family credit are designed to act as an incentive to get people back to work it would be counter-productive to make applicants wait until they had historical information on earnings before their received any benefit. In such circumstances an estimate is made by the applicant of likely future earnings. Housing benefit officers will often do a subsequent check of reality versus estimated and make appropriate adjustments, but no such adjustments are made in respect of benefits paid by the Benefits Agency of the Department of Social Security.
Problems may also arise for those who have suffered changes in personal circumstances which impinge upon business performance. For instance, an absent parent may be assessed by the Child Support Agency on the basis of income during the period when the domestic relationship was still intact, and when the former partner was contributing towards the business by, say, giving labour. Similarly, people who have experienced relationship breakdown may have less energy and enthusiasm for their work which in turn will affect their earnings capacity.
In essence, the selection of an appropriate basis period for the calculation of earnings will always be somewhat arbitrary, and will suit some occupational groups more than others. And this is not a problem specific to the self-employed:
an employee too may have earnings which fluctuate because of overtime work or bonuses.
iii) Computational rules
Consequent to decisions as to what will count as income, and measured over what basis period, are concerns with computational rules. The major issues here concern what is deemed allowable as expenses against income. What is allowed as an expense is, again, the product of the policy motivations of the authority concerned.
Some may be motivated by a desire to curb certain sorts of business behaviour (for instance, the ban on deductions in respect of entertaining for tax purposes) or to encourage others (the granting of allowances for capital costs in lieu of prohibited depreciation deductions).
The approach taken by different agencies may vary considerably on similar points, emphasising the partial and constructed nature of the law and accounting. For instance, until recently the DSS refused to apportion single expenses (such as the rental of phone equipment) between business and private usage, disallowing them in their entirety, on the grounds that the rules state that expenses must be 'wholly and exclusively' for business purposes. This is despite a long established Inland
Revenue practice, found to well grounded in tax law, of allowing the apportionment of expenses with dual purposes (Boden and Corden, 1994 ; Cmd 8189, para 155-60).
Problematic here is the fact that a lack of harmony in the rules may tend to create confusion and dissent, with a corresponding low acceptance of the rules by selfemployed individuals. This will raise both users' and reporters' transaction costs.
The greater the divergence in rules the less scope there will be for harmonisation between agencies. One of the major factors which will affect self-employed people is the reporting environments within which they have to operate. This is rendered even more problematic in the UK context because of the sheer number and diversity of agencies with which self-employed individuals may have to engage. This section considers that environment in its elemental parts.
IV. Administrative arrangements
i) Requesting Information
Requests for financial information from the self-employed necessitates careful consideration. Unlike the presentation of corporate accounts, there is no universal agreed format. The formulation of requests for information must therefore take into account the needs of both users and reporters. The regulatory users must get the required type and detail of information; they must be mindful of the limits of their ability to interpret the information provided (including issues of costs and staff expertise/training); and should be sensitively aware of the need to be fair and maintain natural justice with regard to the self-employed. Because of public-sector performance indicators the system must also be constructed in such a way as to enable tasks to be completed whilst demonstrating efficiency (Boden and Corden, 1996) . The self-employed reporters will be concerned to ensure that the eliciting of information does not unduly intrude into their privacy, does not impose onerous and unwarranted costs (financial and otherwise), is within their means to provide and demonstrates equity with others.
Generally speaking, information may be requested either in the form of conventional accounts, usually drawn up by an accountancy practitioner, or via the completion of an official form. The forms typically require cash basis information.
Some organisations will permit the presentation of information in either format.
Reliance on traditional accruals accounts can be problematic. Not all self-employed people may employ an accountant (for cost or other reasons) and relatively few appear to have the expertise to produce accruals accounts themselves. Moreover, the information provided may not suit all user needs and would then require subsequent adaptation. Such adaptation may result in additional work for both reporter and user, subsequent clarifications and escalates the potential for error.
Difficulties also arise in Britain with the multiplicity of official forms seeking financial information. For instance, those with a turnover of less than £15,000 may complete an extremely abbreviated grid on their tax return which simply asks for gross receipts, expenses and net profit. If the same person applies for family credit they will be presented with a relatively complicated form demanding much greater detail and spread over several pages. Local authorities each produce their own forms for benefits such as housing benefit or community charge benefit, and to some extent these can be tailored to the socio-demographic profile of an area, although the `fit' with the self-employed community is unlikely ever to be 100% (Corden et al, 1993) . Form design is of crucial significance given the heterogeneity of the self-employed community if some individuals are not to be confused/perturbed or simply deterred by a form which apparently has little relevance to their own self-employment.
ii) Comprehension of rules and systems
In the interests of equity and efficiency it makes sense for organisations to ensure that self-employed people understand the rules and procedures to which they are being subjected. The consequences of failing to so may be the disadvantaging of 
iii) Diversity and discretion
Any organisation dealing with the self-employed will have to deal with a broad range of individuals presenting extremely diverse personal and business profiles.
If systems are not to grind to a halt, or generate objections on the grounds that strict adherence to rules produces manifestly unjust or absurd solutions then it may be necessary for individual officers within the organisations to have some discretion as to how they deal with cases. Traditionally the Inland Revenue has a great deal of discretion in dealing with taxpayers in order to reach pragmatic compromises. Because the Board of Inland Revenue is charged under S1 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 with the care and management of taxation the level of discretion is generous. In contrast, the relative rigidity of the CSA formula has generated much public opposition, and legislation to permit some element of departure from the formula was introduced by the Child Support Act 1995.
Because of an adherence to principles of absolute equity between applicants the Benefits Agency has no real room for discretion. Whilst discretion entrains problems of equity and of the perils of policy formulation by default, rigidity and rules-based approaches can lead to inflexibility and costly bureaucracy.
iv) Veracity and audit
Audit by external agents is an important part of the verification process for organisations, whether public or private. Individuals have no statutory audit requirements placed upon them, although they may, from time to time, be audited by a state organisation as part of an investigation connected with deceit or fraud.
Only in relatively unusual circumstances will a self-employed person have a full audit certificate on their accounts.
Financial information from individuals will usually therefore have to be taken on trust unless the end-use agency elects to investigate-a procedure which can be expensive for both parties. In addition, investigation or the threat of it could deter individuals from seeking help and assistance from some agencies, contrary to policy objectives of ensuring, for instance, the maximum take up of a social security benefit. In addition, the non-acceptance of information whilst it is subject to audit could lead to delays in the provision of the service which the individual is seeking.
The only statement as to veracity on most financial information from individuals will be that of the self-employed person her/himself. There are a range of difficulties here. At one extreme, the information provided may be deliberately fraudulent, the threat of audit having been insufficient to act as deterrent. At the other the individual may have insufficient technical skill to realise the deficiencies in poorly kept records (or even to recognise that records are inadequate) and produce information which is unsound. And of course there are a range of possibilities in between these two points.
Not only do the public bodies who use this information have to mindful of their own interests in this matter they also have to account for their use of public funds.
As such, stories of fraudulent behaviour by, for instance, social security applicants, do not sit well with the attempted public image of the Department of Social Security distributing funds to those eligible and in need. The National Audit Office in particular will be anxious to ensure that rates of fraud are as low as possible.
A As a final issue, the lack of harmonisation between the various information users and the rules of confidentiality to which such users are generally bound means that, even if audited by one organisation, the results of that audit will, most often, not be divulged to another organisation. The audits which are undertaken are, in that sense, bounded and extremely private.
vi) Costs
The provision of financial reporting information cannot be cost free. An important system design issue here is how compliance costs are to be divided between the reporter and the user of the information. In times of straightened public expenditure the temptation may be to get the individual to bear the lion's share of costs, either financial or non-financial. Yet this may impose intolerable burdens on some people (particularly if they have to report to more than one organisation) and act as a deterrent to use of any elective services offered.
The Inland Revenue is now moving towards self-assessment for the self-employed.
There have been arguments that the complexity of the new system, relative to the abilities of taxpayers', may mean much greater use of some sort of accounting practitioner. This is the case in countries such as Canada and Australia, where similar systems have engendered a growth in the provision of taxation services to the public. But of course such services must be paid for. This approach can be contrasted with the Child Support Agency. Here, such is the level of concern to gain the cooperation of self-employed absent parents that the agency is undertaking a significant level of work for some individuals-even working with prime records to produce some measure of income.
As reporting requirements proliferate there may well be inexorable pressure for serious attention to be given to the compliance cost burden being imposed on the self-employed. Interestingly this issue has been largely absent from Government pronouncements as part of the much vaunted Deregulation Initiative, and the selfemployed have received only scant consideration in any formal compliance cost assessments 5 undertaken by regulation makers. This may be because these assessments are concerned primarily with business costs and, as far as the selfemployed are concerned, it can be difficult to distinguish costs which are associated with the business and costs which are particular to them in their capacity as private persons. For instance, if an absent self-employed parent incurs costs in dealing with the Child Support Agency then it is arguable whether that is a personal or a business cost. Yet if the same person were an employee then the costs incurred by the employer in dealing with the CSA would clearly be a business cost.
vii) Staff training
The need to deal with a broad range of self-employed people engenders a requirement to have staff within the State adequately trained to deal with the technical issues which will arise. As accounting skills become more central to the regulation of individuals it is apparent that staff within organisations will need to acquire these. The reasons here are multifold: the systems must be operated correctly and in accordance with the rules, policy will have to be formulated sensitively and in such a way as to meet imperatives; staff will need to engage on equal terms with professional accountants; staff may have to explain matters to individuals acting for themselves; and there will be a requirement for audit/investigation.
Outside taxation authorities there is little indication at present that staff are being given the intensive skills-based training or access to resources which they In reality few self-employed people will employ chartered accountants from "the big six"-their fees are too high relative to income levels and the service they offer is possibly not apposite. Yet the family credit work discovered that a number of self-employed people do employ accounting practitioners in very small firms, principally to help them with their tax returns. A number of accountants also acted for their clients in respect of social security claims, and there is growing interest professional interest regarding the Child Support Agency and the selfemployed (Accountants Digest, 1994). The family credit research found two major issues of importance.
First, the Department of Social Security was not particularly well geared-up to interacting with professional accountants: there were no arrangements for recognising the accountant as an agent of the applicant and therefore there were communication problems with matters such as the Benefits Agency not responding to accountants' requests for information and challenges unless pressure was applied. Improved arrangements are now in place to meet this problem. When the CSA was set up it immediately put in place arrangements whereby accountants could be recognised as agents and has not apparently experienced the same problems in this regard as the Benefits Agency.
The second issue was that many applicants for family credit were simply too poor to afford the fees of accountants to act on their behalf. Some accountants we spoke to wrote off such charges, or deferred them in the expectation that their client's business would return to prosperity. Interestingly such altruistic behaviour by accountants appeared to be more noticeable in rural farming communities were the client-accountant relationship was, intuitively, more stable.
The role of professional accounting help is of great importance here. If financial reporting systems are constructed in such a way that the average self-employed person has neither the skills nor the confidence to negotiate their way effectively and cheaply then they will be seriously disempowered if they cannot afford the services of a professional. Similarly, if accountants consequently do very little of this work then they will not gain the necessary expertise with which to help their clients. Some social security applicants gain valuable assistance from bodies such as the Citizens' Advice Bureau, but ultimately there must be a continuing concern that some self-employed people are disadvantaged by the system. Radically, there may be a case here for offering "Accountancy Aid" as a sort of parallel to legal aid here to assist those who are too poor to pay for assistance themselves. The possible need for such a scheme is indicative of the shift in emphasis from legal to accounting skills within the regulation of the self-employed.
The alternative approach, or one which could be allied to the above, is to make the financial reporting systems imposed on people as user-friendly as possible, with explicit commitments by the agencies to get things right, to offer help advice and assistance and to construct their procedures in such a way that they are open and explicit to the lay-person. Such an approach would mirror recent attempts within the legal system to make that system more open and responsive to ordinary people's needs.
V SUMMARY
The self-employed are a group defined for regulatory and administrative purposes.
The definition is imposed rather than being a matter for self-selection because the aim is control. But the definition, like most, is far from unproblematic, dependent as it is on a number of assumptions and buffeted by a number of conflicting policy aims.
Recent years in the UK has seen a remarkable growth in the numbers of people classified as self-employed. This in turn has prompted a growth in the range and nature of the financial reporting requirements placed upon them. The UK has no centralised or fully harmonised system for either defining income, defining basis periods for measurement or computational rules for the assessment of selfemployed earnings. Nor are there any centralised or fully harmonised systems for operationalsing such measurement systems.
This proliferation of diverse requirements leads to problems for both the state and the individual. On both sides transaction costs, the potential for error and the potential for fraud/maladministration are high. Moreover, there may at present be little congruence between policy aims and the systems in place.
The answer to this would not appear to lie in piggy-backing all users onto measures computed by one agency-it is often suggested that taxable income should be the measure of income used by all agencies. There are a number of problems here, all of which have been encountered in Australia. In the first place, to operate such a system is to allow the taxation system to effectively drive the measures used by other agencies with quite different policy aims. In the second place, the operational systems employed by organisations such as the Inland Revenue may not suit the needs of other users-for instance, the figures produced by the Inland Revenue may not be sufficiently timely for the purposes of other.
And finally, the agency which is to be the collator may not willingly accept the responsibility for producing information for widespread use as it may constrain its own actions or affect public perceptions of its role.
despite the Deregulation Initiative. The answer may lie in a more orchestrated approach across government-for instance developing staff training, forms, information packs, advice services and investigation units. There may also be a need for greater cooperation between parts of government. And there may be considerable scope here for a growth in professional accountancy services of an appropriate level, for a fee. What is evident is that this is a problem which will continue to grow, and which requires immediate attention if a group of disparate and often low-income individuals are not to be further disadvantaged through regulation. 
